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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the managerial behavior of ¯rms by estimating a nested objective
function consistent with the framework of Fershtman and Judd (1987). Using data for
Japanese regional banks for FY 1980-FY 2009, we focus on oligopolistic behavior in
the domestic loan market and examine the intensity with which managers attempt to
maximize sales and pro¯ts. We ¯nd that sales-maximization explains the behavior of
Japanese regional banks more adequately and appropriately than pro¯t-maximization.
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e®ort to maximize sales has intensi¯ed after full-scale liberalization of interest rates.
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1 Introduction
Traditional microeconomic theory generally regards pro¯t-maximization as the sole ob-
jective of business ¯rms. However, Baumol (1959) argued that managers exercise dis-
cretion in setting goals and that maximizing sales revenue was a more likely short-run
objective than maximizing pro¯ts in oligopolistic ¯rms. Many economists criticize the
pro¯t-maximization hypothesis. Strategic delegation literature, in particular, introduced
the use of managerial incentive contracts to consider the outcomes of alternative ¯rm
behavior. For instance, Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) showed that in
oligopoly, strategic interaction with rivals in a product market may induce ¯rms' owners
to prefer aggressive competition over maximizing pro¯ts.
On the other hand, recent literature has paid less attention to examining managerial
objectives empirically. Earlier studies (Hall,1967; Lackman and Craycroft, 1974) sup-
ported the sales-maximization hypothesis empirically by directly estimating the objectives
of managers. In particular, Amihud and Kamin (1979) found that revenue-maximizing
behavior is prevalent among large ¯rms, a ¯nding consitent with Baumol's (1959) theo-
retical prediction. Moreover, they conclude that market power in°uences ¯rms' behavior
more than their form of ownership and control.
However, these studies do not consider alternative managerial objectives simultane-
ously, while few others directly examine the legitimacy of pro¯t-maximization1. Di±-
culties in handling the theoretical premise of pro¯t function may explain this shortage
of studies. For instance, as Farrell and Klemperer (2007) suggested, testing the pro¯t-
maximization hypothesis is complicated because the uniqueness of equilibria cannot be
guaranteed and possible equilibria often are sensitive to the details of the model. More-
over, it is empirically di±cult to account from published data for the multiple and het-
erogeneous products observed in many industries.
Without estimating the utility or pro¯t functions directly, this paper empirically in-
vestigates maximizing sales as a deliberately chosen alternative to maximizing pro¯ts. To
simultaneously take dual managerial objectives into accout, we propose a simple nested
objective function using the framework of Fershtman and Judd (1987). Thus, we are able
to examine the intensity with which managers seek to maximize sales and pro¯ts. As
per our knowledge, this paper is the ¯rst to investigate both objectives simultaneously.
We choose Japan's regional banking sector as our subject of empirical study because
its primal product loans is regarded as fairly homogeneous, thereby removing the con-
cerns raised about earlier studies. Also, although Japan's mega banks have expanded
aggressively into non-interest income activities, lending remains the main revenue base
of regional banks.
Another reason to focus on managerial objectives of Japan's regional banks is that
1Instead, several studies examine pro¯t e±ciency through estimating stochastic frontier pro¯t func-
tions based upon the premise that ¯rms seek to maximize pro¯ts. Direct estimation of the dual pro¯t or
normalized pro¯t frontier has been studied in Hollas and Stansell (1988), Kumbhakar and Bhattacharyya
(1992), and Kumbhakar (1996).
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few earlier studies suggested a non-competitive market structure by examining expense
preference behavior or the practice of amakudari, accepting ex-senior o±cials from the
regulatory authorities (Izawa and Tsutsui, 1998; Yamori, 1998; Horiuchi and Shimizu,
2001)2. In particular, Izawa and Tsutsui (1998) provided evidence that pro¯t-maximizing
behavior was absent during the mid 1980's despite the progress of ¯nancial liberalization.
Furthermore, Uchida and Tsutsui (2005) found that competition was weaker among re-
gional banks than among city banks even though the overall competition in the Japanese
loan markets has strengthed during the ¯nal quarter of the 20th century. Their ¯ndings
are consistent with Uchida and Nakagawa (2007) that herding behavior has been observed
among regional banks.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used to
investigate the bank's mixed managerial objectives. Section 3 describes our data. Section
4 presents and interprets our empirical results. Section 5 summarizes and conclude.
2 Methodology
We assume that banks compete ¶a la Cournot in the loan market. Therefore, the strategic
variable of bank i is its supply of loans xi
3. The aggregate supply of loans X determines
the loan rate p(X). In order to account for the hybrid managerial objectives of regional
bank managers, we de¯ne the objective function that is coincident with the framework
of Fershtman and Judd (1987) as follows:
Oi = ¹fp(X)xi ¡ cixig+ (1¡ ¹)p(X)xi (1)
where p(X) denotes the inverse demand function for bank loans. xi and ci are the loan
amounts and marginal cost for bank i. ¹ is the parameter representing the degree of
managerial objectives of regional bank managers. Higher values for ¹ imply greater
intensity of pro¯t-maximizing behavior; therefore, if ¹ = 1, pro¯t-maximization can be
considered as the objective of regional bank managers. In contrast, lower values ¹ imply
greater intensity of sales-maximizing behavior. Thus, ¹ = 0 implies that regional bank
managers regard maximizing sales as their primary objective.
Di®erentiating the bank manager's objective function above, we derive the ¯rst order
condition. This equation can be transformed in terms of price elasticity of loan demand,
which is given by
2Among studies outside the banking industry, Weinstein and Yafeh (1995) suggest that manufacturers
owned by Japanese ¯nancial groups (keiretsu) are heavily in°uenced by their banks to raise production
levels beyond those warranted purely by maximizing pro¯ts.
3The banking literature presents no consensus about the presumption of competition. Since our
sample covers periods before full-scale liberalization of interest rates, Bertrand competition may not be
appropriate. In previous studies, not for Japanese banks, some models assume Cournot competition
(Calem and Carlino, 1991; Berg and Kim, 1994).
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p(X) ¢ ¡1¡ si
²
¢
= ¹ci (2)
where ² is price elasticity of loan demand (²=¡p(X)/Xp0(X)), and si is the loan market
share for bank i, de¯ned as the ratio of each regional bank's loan to the aggregate supply
of loans X (i.e., xi/X)
4. Price elasticity of loan demand is obtained from the loan demand
function, given by
lnX = ®¡ ² ln p+ Z¯ (3)
where Z is an exogenous variable vector and ®, ², and ¯ are parameters to be estimated.
Each bank's marginal cost is transformed from a translog functional form.
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where C, y, and w are variables denoting total cost, outputs, and input prices, respec-
tively. DMt is a set of year dummy variables. ®, ¯, ± and ´ are estimation parameters. To
account for diversi¯cations of regional loan markets, we include a set of regional dummy
variables (DMr) and interaction terms with loan output
5.
In the empirical investigation, we ¯rst estimate the cost function in Eq. (4). We then
compute the marginal cost of loans for each bank by di®erentiating the cost function with
respect to output for loans6. Next, using these calculated marginal costs, we estimate
Eqs. (2) and (3) simultaneously to obtain estimates for degrees of managerial objectives
(¹) and the price elasticity of loan demand (²). By considering empirical simplicity, ¹ is
transported from the right to the left side in Eq. (2), and then 1=¹ is estimated as a new
parameter. Further, to ascertain the degree of managerial objectives each year, ¹ in Eq.
(2) is identi¯ed with a set of year dummy variables as follows:
4This de¯nition is employed because Tsutsui and Kano (2003) found that Japanese regional banks'
loan markets are not segmented at the prefectural level. Indeed, many regional banks expand their branch
networks beyond prefectures where their heado±ces are located in, their activities are not limited to the
prefectural level.
5We constructed regional dummies by dividing Japan into nine representative regions following the
district boundary of the local ¯nance bureau (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Tokai, Hokuriku, Kansai,
Chugoku, Shikoku, and Kyushu).
6Following standard practice, we impose the restrictions on symmetry and linear homogeneity in the
input prices in Eq. (4). Also, all the observations on independent variables except dummy variables are
divided by their respective sample mean.
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¹ = µ0 +
X
t
µtDMt (5)
where µ0 is a constant representing the degree of managerial objectives for a given year
and µt is a set of parameters for each year other than a given year.
3 Data
We use data for Japan's regional banks from FY 1980 to FY 2009. There were 105 regional
banks at the end of FY 2010. Japan features two types of regional banks: ¯rst tier and
second tier. Although lending by former second-tier regional banks was restricted prior to
the 1980s, we disregard di®erences between the two types because ¯nancial liberalization
erased di®erences in their permissible lines of business7. We split the data into two periods
to account for full-scale liberalization of interest rates in 1994 and examine time trends
in managerial objectives. The earlier period spans FY 1980-FY 1994 while the latter FY
1995-FY 20098.
With regard to output speci¯cations for the cost function, we adopt an intermediation
approach that assesses banks as ¯nancial intermediaries that employ labor and capital
to transform deposits into loans and other earning assets. There are two outputs (y);
total loans and total securities; three input prices (w); personal expenses per number of
employees, non-personal expenses to total movable and immovable capital, and interest
expenses to total deposits. Total costs (C) are the sum of the expenses for labor, cap-
ital, and interest. Financial statement data is obtained from the Analysis of Financial
Statements of All Banks published by the Japanese Bankers' Association. In the loan
demand function, the price of loans (lending rate) is identi¯ed as identical for all regional
banks because we assume Cournot competition. Data for loan rates are derived from the
long-term time series data of the main Bank of Japan statistics released on its website9.
Descriptive statistics of variables are shown in Table 1.
7The present second-tier regional banks were former mutual savings banks that were allowed to
become commercial banks in 1989. Unlike ¯rst-tier regional banks, they were allowed to ¯nance only
small ¯rms, although installment ¯nancing was permitted
8Japan's ¯nancial system was highly regulated until the 1980s. Gradual liberalization of interest rates
began in 1987.
9The Bank of Japan reports annual average loan rates for each ¯nancial institutions' business category.
Therefore, we de¯ne the undi®erentiated price of loans by calculating their geometric mean for regional
banks and second-tier regional banks for each year.
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4 Results
4.1 Changes in managerial objectives
The left of Table 2 shows the estimation results for the sample period FY 1980-FY 199410.
As shown in the estimate of ², price elasticity of loan demand is statistically signi¯cant
and positive; thus, it is consistent with economic theory because the sign of the parameter
² is positive in the loan demand function in Eq.(3). The estimate of ¯1 has a signi¯cantlly
positive sign indicating that a higher market share relates to a larger demand for loans.
Most importantly this paper estimates µ representing the yearly changes in the degree
of managerial objectives. In Table 2, µ0 denotes the constant term in Eq. (4), re°ecting
the degree of managerial objectives for FY 1980. Estimates of a set of parameters µ,
as indicated by the subscript of year, indicate the di®erences from the constant term.
Thus, degrees of managerial objectives for each year other than FY 1980 can be obtained
by calculating the inverse of the sum of µ0 and each yearly estimate of µ. As shown on
the left of Table 2, most values are statistically signi¯cant at 1%. We can reject the
null hypothesis that all coe±cients of yearly dummy variables are zero at 1% signi¯cance
level.
Figure 1 shows the yearly °uctuations calculated by the aforementioned formula. A
drastic decreasing trend is observed: values of parameter ¹ representing the degree of
managerial objectives fell from 0.0066 in FY 1980 to 0.0029 in FY 1994. These results
suggest that sales-maximization is a more appropriate interpretation of Japanese regional
bank's behavior before the full-scale liberalization of interest rates. However, a slight
upward trend occured in the late 1980s, Japan's bubble economy was at its peak, and
its banks were lending expansively. Therefore, it seems that such aberrant economic
conditions loosen the intensity sales-maximization behavior.
The right of Table 2 presents corresponding results for the sample period, FY 1995-
FY 2009. Similar to previous results, since the estimate of ² has an expected positive
sign and is statistically signi¯cant, the theoretically consistent loan demand function is
obtained. With regard to the estimates of the set of parameters µ, almost values are also
statistically signi¯cant at 1% levels. The null hypothesis that all coe±cients of yearly
dummy variables are zero also can be rejected at 1% signi¯cance level.
Figure 2 displays the corresponding yearly °uctuations in the degree of managerial ob-
jectives. Although the estimate of parameters µ for FY 1996 is insigni¯cant, a consistent
downward trend is observed. In addition, values of parameter ¹ are seemingly smaller
than the results in Figure 1: the value for FY 2009 (0.0009) is less than one-fourteenth
the value for FY 1980 (0.0066). Thus, even though ¯nancial liberalization arose in 1990s,
results indicate that sales-maximization still explains the behavior of the Japan's regional
banks.
10Hereafter, estimates of cost function coe±cients are available by contacting the authors.
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4.2 Controlling non-performing loans
As described earlier, the lower signi¯cant estimates of yearly dummy variables for the
late 1990s may result from the depression triggered by the burst of the bubble economy.
Most regional banks su®ered from massive non-performing loans throughout the 1990s,
peaking in March 2002. These non-performing loans could lead to these biased estimates.
To address that possibility, we re-estimate our model by excluding the book values of non-
performing loans from total loans. However, because the disclosure of non-performing
loans has been required since FY 1998, thus the sample period is not consistent with the
former analysis11.
Table 3 presents new evidence for the period FY 1998-FY 2009. To account for the
e®ect of each bank's ¯nancial health on loan demand, we add the non-performing loans
ratio as a control variable, its parameter is indicated by ¯2. Consistent with results
in Table 2, the estimate of ² is statistically signi¯cant with a positive sign; thus, the
theoretically consistent loan demand function is obtained. Estimates of the parameter
set µ are also generally statistically signi¯cant.
Figure 3 displays yearly °uctuations in the degree of managerial objectives. Compared
to results in Figure 2, values of parameter ¹ change marginally. For instance, the value
in FY 2000 changes from 0.0006 to 0.0009. Further, a downward trend still is evident:
values of parameter ¹ fall from 0.0010 in FY 1998 to 0.0005 in FY 2009. These results
strongly support the sales-maximization hypothesis for Japan's regional banks, even until
recently. Also, these results are consistent with the ¯ndings by Uchida and Tsutsui
(2005) that regional banks are less competitive than city banks in Japanese loan markets
by investigating the ¯rst-order condition for pro¯t-maximization. These results support
Izawa and Tsutsui (1998), who found no evidence of pro¯t-maximization or expense
preference behaviors in Japanese banking.
5 Conclusions
Little recent academic literature has empirically examined the managerial objectives of
¯rms, and its prevailing theoretical framework still considers maximizing pro¯ts as the
¯rms' proper objective. However, pure pro¯t-maximization seems to be a less obvious
goal among modern corporations, where ownership is separated from control. We have
analyzed the managerial behavior of Japan's regional banks by estimating a nested objec-
tive function consistent following Fershtman and Judd (1987). Using data from FY 1980
through FY 2009, we focused on oligopolistic behavior in Japan's domestic loan market
and examined the intensity with which banks sought to maximize sales and pro¯ts.
We found empirically that sales-maximization explains the behavior of Japanese re-
gional banks more adequately and appropriately than maximizing pro¯ts. Although we
11Although regional banks had begun to disclosing loans to bankrupt borrowers since 1993, ¯nancial
regulators strengthened disclosure standards for non-performing loans in FY 1997.
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compared results by bifurcating the sample into periods pre-and post full-scale liberaliza-
tion of interest rates, sales-maximizing behavior appears to be even more intense in recent
years post-liberalization. Moreover, robustness of results was obtained when book value
of non-performing loans from total loans was excluded. Yearly °uctuations in the de-
gree of managerial objectives suggest a stronger recent tendency for sales-maximization.
Our results are consistent with previous studies that suggest lowere competition among
Japanese regional banks in domestic loan markets. Of course, the distinct environment
of Japanese banking in recent years for example, severe entry barriers and extremely low
interest rates likely in°uences these results. Our results do not necessarily reject the
possibility of price competition in Japan's loan markets.
Therefore, we highlight the ¯ndings obtained from the nested objective function of
sales- and pro¯t-maximization. While earlier research generally took for granted that
competitive ¯rms act to maximize pro¯ts, our results suggest that strategic delegation
may generate sales-maximizing behavior. Future researchers can use this to enhance the
empirical work we have begun. In particular, future research needs to identify other
industries with homogeneous products and, apply our analysis to learn further lessons
and validate our methodology.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics on variables used in the estimation
Sample period
1980-1994 1995-2009
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Total cost 64,781 64,162 34,223 27,415
Loans 914,094 996,894 1,560,013 1,347,209
Securities 244,089 268,005 506,933 493,580
Price of labor 6.3569 1.2884 8.0309 1.1081
Price of deposit 3.6986 0.8973 0.3773 0.3641
Price of capital 0.4494 0.1126 0.4377 0.2050
Price of loans 6.5362 1.1479 2.4249 0.3449
Loan market share 0.0083 0.0076 0.0088 0.0076
Number of sample 1979 1741
1. Monetary variables are in millions of Yen.
2. Prices of deposit and loans are are expressed in percentage.
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Table 2: Estimation results
Sample period
1980-1994 1995-2009
Parameter Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
® 9.5623 0.3391 ¤¤¤ 11.3686 0.3127 ¤¤¤
² 1.2384 0.1187 ¤¤¤ 0.5272 0.0851 ¤¤¤
¯1 26.1181 3.4555 ¤¤¤ 65.5677 2.7162 ¤¤¤
µ0 150.4380 6.6494 ¤¤¤ 833.3000 64.8453 ¤¤¤
µy1981 -6.3175 8.4824
µy1982 65.0790 9.1547 ¤¤¤
µy1983 72.4908 9.5221 ¤¤¤
µy1984 33.8313 9.2413 ¤¤¤
µy1985 22.5682 9.4276 ¤¤
µy1986 33.4287 10.8407 ¤¤¤
µy1987 58.3571 12.6632 ¤¤¤
µy1988 57.7959 14.0094 ¤¤¤
µy1989 -15.0774 12.8137
µy1990 -72.6368 11.8734 ¤¤¤
µy1991 -26.9081 13.6328 ¤¤
µy1992 52.7080 17.5392 ¤¤¤
µy1993 156.7510 24.1361 ¤¤¤
µy1994 191.3850 26.4302 ¤¤¤
µy1996 92.8155 90.5117
µy1997 173.5410 93.3668 ¤
µy1998 154.6110 93.1118 ¤
µy1999 221.4120 95.4846 ¤¤
µy2000 261.3600 96.6345 ¤¤¤
µy2001 416.1210 102.0140 ¤¤¤
µy2002 406.7000 103.5400 ¤¤¤
µy2003 444.8290 107.4130 ¤¤¤
µy2004 594.5170 115.6300 ¤¤¤
µy2005 785.7420 127.9520 ¤¤¤
µy2006 786.1460 128.5690 ¤¤¤
µy2007 717.7650 130.2190 ¤¤¤
µy2008 1039.6300 152.8230 ¤¤¤
µy2009 1101.8500 158.8590 ¤¤¤
Observations 1979 1741
R-squared
Eq.(2) 0.0024 0.0022
Eq.(3) 0.4650 0.7649
1.¤¤¤, ¤¤ and ¤ stand for signi¯cance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels.
2. White's heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimates are used.
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Figure.1 Yearly °uctuation in the managerial objective from FY 1980 to FY 1994
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Figure.2 Yearly °uctuation in the managerial objective from FY 1995 to FY 2009
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Table 3: Estimation results
(Excluding non-performing loans)
Sample period
1998-2009
Parameter Estimate Std. Err.
® 11.0588 0.4935 ¤¤¤
² 0.6426 0.1296 ¤¤¤
¯1 60.5303 3.0051 ¤¤¤
¯2 -2.3366 0.3263 ¤¤¤
µ0 968.7520 74.2714 ¤¤¤
µy1999 77.3415 97.5645 ¤¤¤
µy2000 98.7338 98.8833
µy2001 231.6720 106.4500 ¤¤
µy2002 258.2250 107.8360 ¤¤
µy2003 334.3550 111.8940 ¤¤¤
µy2004 499.4450 119.4280 ¤¤¤
µy2005 684.7360 132.1580 ¤¤¤
µy2006 630.0690 130.1530 ¤¤¤
µy2007 564.5090 130.8290 ¤¤¤
µy2008 844.3880 153.3090 ¤¤¤
µy2009 992.3160 162.6730 ¤¤¤
Observations 1358
R-squared
Eq.(2) 0.0010
Eq.(3) 0.7702
1. ¤¤¤ and ¤¤ stand for signi¯cance at the 1% and 5% levels.
2. White's heteroskedasticity consistent covariance estimates are used.
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Figure.3 Yearly °uctuation in the managerial objective from FY 1998 to FY 2009
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